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I. ALGORITHMIC INDUCTION
There appear to be at least two approaches to induc-
tion. The first route is by intuition and ingenuity. It has
been successfully pursued by geniuses and gifted individ-
uals. A typical representative of this approach to knowl-
edge is Ramanujan who seemed to have attributed his
revelations to a Hindu Goddess [1]. In western thought,
this is often more secularly referred to as Platonism.
Go¨del seemed to have held the opinion that our minds
have access to truth, which can be discovered through
personal insights – maybe even beyond the bounds of
universal computability – in particular, that minds are
not (Turing) machines [2, p. 216]. As successful these
narratives may have been, they remain anecdotal and
cannot be generalized.
When it comes to ad hoc revelations of individuals,
there may also be psychological issues. These have been
described by Freud [3], pointing to the dangers caused
by “temptations to project, what [the analyst] in dull
self-perception recognizes as the peculiarities of his own
personality, as generally valid theory into science.” A
similar warning comes from Jaynes’ warning against the
“Mind Projection Fallacy” [4, 5], pointing out that “we
are all under an ego-driven temptation to project our pri-
vate thoughts out onto the real world, by supposing that
the creations of one’s own imagination are real proper-
ties of Nature, or that one’s own ignorance signifies some
kind of indecision on the part of Nature.
A second approach could be conceived in the spirit of
Turing [6]. In this line of thought, it is possible to obtain
knowledge about a system by mechanical, algorithmic
procedures; such as a deterministic agent “provided with
paper, pencil and rubber, and subject to strict discipline
[carrying out a set of rules of procedure written down]” [7,
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p. 34]. Recently one of the more promising approaches
to algorithmic induction has been machine learning [8].
Two caveats should be stated upfront. First, the gen-
eral induction problem is unsolvable with respect and rel-
ative to universal computational capacities [9–12]. So, in
certain (even constructible) situations machine learning,
like all other algorithmic induction strategies, provably
fails. But that does not exclude heuristic methods of
induction, such as machine learning applied to physical
phenomena. Second, theoretical constructions cannot be
expected to faithfully represent the “laws underlying” a
phenomenology. As Lakatos [13] points out, the progres-
siveness and degeneracy of research programs are tran-
sient. In this approach the “explanations” and theoreti-
cal models generated by machine learning present knowl-
edge and explanations which cannot claim to have any
ontological, only epistemic, relevance – they are means
relative to the methods employed.
Whereas machine learning has already been applied to
very specific problems in high energy [14] and solid state
physics [15], we would like to propose it as a very general
method of theory formation and induction.
II. LINEAR MODELS OF INERTIAL MOTION
In what follows a linear regression model [8, Sect. 5.1.4]
will be used. Thereby we shall, if not stated explicitly
otherwise, closely follow the notation of Mermin’s book
on Quantum Computer Science [16].
Suppose, for the sake of demonstration, a one-
dimensional physical system of a particle in inertial mo-
tion. Suppose further that it has been (approximately)
measured already at n ≥ 2 positions x1, . . . , xn at times
t1, . . . , tn, respectively. The goal is to find a general al-
gorithm which could predict where its location at an ar-
bitrary time τ .
In what follows the respective positions and times are
(not necessarily successively) arranged as n-tuples; that
is, as a finite ordered list of elements, and interpreted as
2(n× 1)-matrices
|x〉 ≡
(
xi1 , . . . , xin
)⊺
|t〉 ≡
(
ti1 , . . . , tin
)⊺
;
(1)
whereby the superscript ⊺ indicates transposition, and
i1, . . . , in are arbitrary permutations of 1, . . . , n. That
is, it is not necessary to order the events temporally;
actually they can “run backwards” or be randomly ar-
ranged [17].
A linear regression Ansatz is to find a linear model for
the prediction of some unknown observable, given some
anecdotal instances of its performance. More formally,
let y be an arbitrary observable, which depends on n
parameters x1, . . . , xn by linear means, that is, by
y =
n∑
i=1
xiri = 〈x|r〉, (2)
where 〈x| = (|x〉)⊺ is the transpose of the vector |x〉, the
tuple
|r〉 =
(
r1, . . . , rn
)⊺
(3)
contains the unknown weights of the approximation –
the “theory,” if you like – and 〈a|b〉 =
∑
i aibi stands for
the Euclidean scalar product of the tuples interpreted as
(dual) vectors in n-dimensional (dual) vector space Rn.
Given are m known instances of (2); that is, m pairs(
zj , |xj〉
)
are known. These data can be bundled into an
m-tuple
|z〉 ≡
(
zj1 , . . . , zjm
)⊺
, (4)
and an (m× n)-matrix
X ≡


xj1i1 . . . xj1in
...
...
...
xjmi1 . . . xjmin

 (5)
where j1, . . . , jm are arbitrary permutations of 1, . . . ,m,
and the matrix rows are just the vectors |xjk〉 ≡(
xjki1 . . . , xjkin
)⊺
.
The task is to compute a “good” estimate of |r〉; that is,
an estimate of |r〉 which allows an “optimal” computation
of the prediction y.
Suppose that a good way to measure the performance
of the prediction from some particular definite but un-
known |r〉 with respect to the m given data
(
zj , |xj〉
)
is
by the mean squared error (MSE)
MSE =
1
m
‖|y〉 − |z〉‖2 =
1
m
‖X|r〉 − |z〉‖2
=
1
m
(X|r〉 − |z〉)
⊺
(X|r〉 − |z〉)
=
1
m
(〈r|X⊺ − 〈z|) (X|r〉 − |z〉)
=
1
m
(〈r|X⊺X|r〉 − 〈z|X|r〉 − 〈r|X⊺|z〉+ 〈z|z〉)
=
1
m
[〈r|X⊺X|r〉 − 〈z| (〈r|X⊺)
⊺
− 〈r|X⊺|z〉 + 〈z|z〉]
=
1
m
{
〈r|X⊺X|r〉 − [(〈r|X⊺)⊺]
⊺
|z〉
−〈r|X⊺|z〉+ 〈z|z〉}
=
1
m
(〈r|X⊺X|r〉 − 2〈r|X⊺|z〉+ 〈z|z〉) .
(6)
In order to minimize the mean squared error (6) with
respect to variations of |r〉 one obtains a condition for
“the linear theory” |y〉 by setting its derivatives (its gra-
dient) to zero; that is
∂|r〉MSE = 0. (7)
A lengthy but straightforward computation yields
∂
∂ri
(
rjX
⊺
jkXklrl − 2rjX
⊺
jkzk + zjzj
)
= δijX
⊺
jkXklrl + rjX
⊺
jkXklδil − 2δijX
⊺
jkzk
= X⊺ikXklrl + rjX
⊺
jkXki − 2X
⊺
ikzk
= X⊺ikXklrl + X
⊺
ikXkjrj − 2X
⊺
ikzk
= 2X⊺ikXkjrj − 2X
⊺
ikzk
≡ 2 (X⊺X|r〉 − X⊺|z〉) = 0
(8)
and finally, upon multiplication with (X⊺X)
−1
from the
left,
|r〉 = (X⊺X)
−1
X
⊺|z〉. (9)
A short plausibility check for n = m = 1 yields the linear
dependency |z〉 = X|r〉.
Coming back to the one-dimensional physical system
of a particle in inertial motion, we could characterize in-
ertial motion in machine learning and linear regression
terms by the requirement that the Ansatz (2) is “good”
in the sense that predictions can be made to a “sufficient
degree” (a term which is arbitrary, subjective and thus
conventional); that is, within a pre-defined error.
If the particle does not pass through the origin,
it might be necessary to augment Eq. (2) with an
affine term b, which can be absorbed into |x′〉 =(
x1, . . . , xn, 1
)⊺
and |r′〉 =
(
r1, . . . , rn, b
)⊺
such that
y =
n∑
i=1
xiri = 〈x|r〉 + d =
n+1∑
i=1
x′ir
′
i. (10)
3III. NONLINEAR MODELS OF NONINERTIAL
MOTION
The linear Ansatz (2) fails for noninertial motion. One
possible way to cope with nonlinearities would be to
introduce extra dimensions corresponding to nonlinear
terms, such as xl for 2 ≤ l ≤ d < ∞; with the conse-
quence that the dimensionality of the parameter space
increases.
In order to cope with nonlinear phenomena, deep for-
ward networks have been used in machine learning [8,
Chapt. 6]. This strategy of deep learning invokes in-
termediate hidden theoretical layers of description which
communicate with each other. For the sake of an ex-
ample, suppose there are two functions g and h, con-
nected in a chain by functional substitution, such that
f(x) = h(g(x)). The length of the chain is identified
with the depth of the model – in this case two. g is the
first layer of the model. The final layer – in this case h –
is called the output layer.
Unfortunately, the linear regression Ansatz (10) for g
and h would effectively be linear again. Therefore, in
order to model a nonlinear phenomenology, a nonlinear
Ansatz for at least one layer. Such networks are capable
of approximating any Borel measurable function (and its
derivative, even if it a generalized function) from one
finite dimensional space to another [18–20].
However, it could be suspected that, despite the fact
that this approximation is “good,” the task of finding
such an approximation might not be constructive. In-
deed, because if such a learning would be computable as
it may imply the (approximate) “solution” of the gen-
eral rule inference problem [9–12], which it turn can be
reduced to the halting problem of universal computers.
This is not dissimilar to solutions of the n-body prob-
lem [21], which, if the system encodes a universal com-
puter, turn out to be uncomputable [22].
IV. DISCUSSION
One objection for applying machine learning algo-
rithms to physical theory creation might be that it lacks
“meaning;” that is, that it amounts to pure syntax de-
void of any semantics. If the semantics is omitted, there
can be no true “understanding” of the “physics behind”
the phenomena.
One may counter this criticism by noticing that, first,
underlying such objections is the premise that there ac-
tually is something to be discovered or revealed. This
realistic ontology is by far nontrivial, and is heavily de-
bated [23]. If, for example, the phenomena emerge from
primordial chaos, such as in Greek mythology and cos-
mology, χάος, then any “meaning” one might present and
“discover” ultimately remains a (pragmative) narrative,
or a mathematical abstraction such as Ramsey theory
at best: for any data, there cannot be no correlations –
regardless of the origin or type of empirical data, there
always has to be some, maybe spurious [24], regularity or
coincidences or properties. How can it be excluded that
the laws of physics are nothing but yet undiscovered con-
sequences of Ramsey theory?
Second, as has already been pointed out, historic ev-
idence seems to suggest that successive physical models
(say, of gravity) are not continuously evolving; but that
they are disruptive and dissimilar [13, 25]. One may even
go so far as to suggest that, in any case, theories are
(more or less [26]) successful believe systems; very much
like Greek mythology [27].
Third, also the present perception of the quantum me-
chanical formalism includes, among other inclinations,
the position that no interpretation is necessary [28]; that
indeed, interpretation is even dangerous and detremental
for the researcher [29, p. 129]; or that, at the very least,
there are no issues with respect to interpretation [30].
Nevertheless it might be quite amusing to study toy
universes capable of universal computation, such as Con-
way’s game of life, via intrinsic, embedded, machine
learning algorithms. It could not be excluded that these
kind of algorithmic agents “come up” with the “right
rules;” that is, those rules which define the toy mini-
universe. It can be expected that if a machine learning
algorithm performs excellent on particular problems then
it necessarily has a degraded performance on the set of
all remaining problems [31, 32].
In any case, the ways how physical theories by human
individuals are created is not totally dissimilar from ma-
chine learning.
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